Sustainable Development as Cargo Cult: Strange Tales of Scale Making from Melanesia and Beyond by Golub, Alex
Sustainable Development as Cargo Cult: Strange Tales of Scale Making from Melanesia 
and Beyond
By Alex Golub
For AAA session "Arenas, Audiences and Knowledge: Regimes of Credibility in Environ-
mental Politics"
Washington DC AAA  11/30/2007
This version 5 Dec 07
Abstract
While the hyper-exotic discourse of 'cargo cult' continues to draw attention in popular media rep-
resentations of Melanesia, many anthropologists have noted that the movements thus labeled rep-
resent a more general Melanesian form of sociality which emphasizes the creation of social unity 
as a means of obtaining wealth. This paper contrasts 'Cargo Cults' with corporate and environ-
mentalist discourses of  sustainable development, which seeks to unite stakeholders in a state of 
social unity in order to obtain wealth and the good life. In both cases the success of desired 
change at the macro-level depends on micro-level subjects taking "ownership" of the proposed 
changes to social life. The difference is that some 'cargo cults' such as the Christian Fellowship 
Church in the Solomons and the John Frum movement in Vanuatu have created social orders 
which have endured for decades while the vast majority of 'development' projects in Melanesia 
have failed. This paper asks: how and why do white discourses render credible, believable, and 
intelligible discourses of 'sustainable development' 'fighting corruption' and 'capacity building' 
while the macro-level aspirations of grassroots aspirations slip constantly back into the deroga-
tory and exoticizing label of 'cargo cult'? Can our sense of an unproblematic notion of 'credibil-
ity' emerge unscathed in a world where Melanesian enthusiasm for organizations like 'integrated 
conservation and development areas' is now continuous with white dreams of reforming Melane-
sian social orders in the name of the environment?
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 "A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member pro-
ceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wher-
ever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence 
as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately con-
cerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist 
on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted.  
There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its com-
ing."
-- William James, The Will To Believe
"The New Guinea native is not unreliable. He is worse -- he is unpredictable."
- N.M. Bird, Pacific Island Monthly 1945
 How can we use the notion of 'regimes of credibility' to make sense, anthropologically, 
of  environmental politics in the Pacific and Southeast Asia? This paper is an attempt to answer 
these questions through an extended riff on two ethnographic situations -- the promises made by 
'cargo cults' in Melanesia and the similar, but differently credible (in most people's opinions), 
promises made of 'sustainable development' made by the Porgera gold mine. So this paper fo-
cuses on the 'environment' not in the sense of its 'preservation'  but rather in the way in which it 
is destroyed and put elsewhere -- into waste dumps, tailings, and so forth. Sorry about that. 
As the quotes from my slide indicate, I am interested in how 'social organisms' in James's 
sense, come to be taken for granted.  I seek, in other words, to understand not how environmental 
politics becomes "not only intelligible but believable and convincing to particular audiences" (as 
our session abstract puts it) but how collective subjects become actors whose existence and effi-
cacy come to seem credible in particular places and time.  
James's invocation of precursive faith in social organisms is an early statement of a 
social-scientific common place: That in any particular situation actors invoke macrosociological 
categories as the 'context' within which their interaction takes place and which entail roles for 
them inhabit. To telegraph very briefly my larger scholarly project, I am interested in replacing 
the notion of 'visibility' suggested by James C. Scott and the optical metaphor which presumes a 
pre-constituted, viewing collective subject for a notion of 'feasibility' which examines the process 
by which, in particular places and times, people come to convince others and themselves that 
they are personating a collective subjectivity (Hanks 1996:233).
My work thus examines Porgera and Papua New Guinea as a natural laboratory. Histori-
cally New Guinea (and the Pacific more generally) has been considered a 'natural laboratory' in 
the sense that an assortment -- excuse me, an 'assemblage' -- of cultural and ecological juxtaposi-
tions were to provide a clean identification of the causal factors that shape society (Hunt 1995). I 
would argue that Papua New Guinea acts as a 'laboratory' in the STS sense of the word because 
of the way it problematizes the purification of corporate and government identities in ways that 
render their credibility-making processes (normally invisible) visible and available for analysis1. 
At issue is not the prexistence of a macro actor who ‘sees’ (or, rather, is pathologically myopic) 
or who ‘reads’ the subjects made ‘legible’ to it. Instead the question is how people’s assumptions 
about the existence of this actor inform the precursive faith which guides their actions such that 
the actor in question appears. Opening, as it were, the 'black boxes' into which, as Latour and 
Callon put it, Leviathans stuff themselves (Latour and Callon 1981). 
1 Obviously I’m not the only person to do this. For STS and historical sociology see James Carrol’s “Sci-
ence, Technology, and the State”. Then of course there is the work of Tania Li, Ferguson and Gupta, 
Mitchell on the state. To a certain extent this is people kicking over the coals of STS in order to recover its 
original incarnation as the ‘social problems’ literature.
Sustainability -- the world-ordering efficacy necessary to create a peaceful and prosper-
ous future -- is more about Leviathans than Latour and Callon may realize. In the Ancient Near 
East -- where scale making and collective subjectivities first really began to take off -- the world 
was ordered and made fertile after a deity defeated the Leviathan in a massive cosmogonic battle 
of order versus chaos2. Kings often legitimated their rule via their connection with diety, and 
their reigns were seen as recreations of a higher cosmic ‘order’3. The whole point was that god 
defeated the Leviathan. By the times Hobbes had gotten his hot little protestant hands on the 
concept, the king was Leviathan. So much for the native anthropology of Western cosmology 4. 
It would be interesting to read the corporate literature on sustainability with a eye towards 
cosmogonic ordering rather than superhuman punishment. Let me give this a run in Papua New 
Guinea.
Located in the far west of Enga province in the highlands of Papua New Guinea and op-
erated by its majority shareholder, the Toronto-based transnational Barrick Gold, most people 
would say that the Porgera gold mine 'exists'. Proof of its efficacy as a collective subject is usu-
ally given with reference to its ability to coordinate action through space and time. In 1992 – its 
second year of production – when it produced 1,485,077 ounces of gold, making it the third most 
productive gold mine in the world (Jackson and Banks 2002). In 2001 it moved roughly 200,000 
2 Smith, “Origins of Biblical Monotheism”, Levinson, “Creation and the Persistence of Evil” Day, “God’s 
Battle with the Dragon”, Gunkel, “Schopfung und Chaos”
3 On “Order” see Baines and Yoffee. Although I’m not touching on other classic ‘early civilizations’ here I 
think the Chinese and Egyptian cases have similar examples of Order (but not really Leviathans). This is 
a classic trope in tons of other ‘complex’ societies (Polynesia, Mesoamerica, Inca etc.) of course.
4 ‘native cosmology’ -- Sahlins. These protestant hands were, of course, in the service of Catholic Stuarts. 
And of course it’s not Hobbes’s fault that this battle got edited out of Genesis and not the Psalms and 
Job.
tons of earth daily. In 2004 the mine produced roughly 740,000 ounces of gold. In 2007 its ware-
house held over one million unique inventory kinds of inventory. The mine logistics manager 
schedules cargo shipping from ports as far away as Singapore. As Adam T. Smith has noted5, 
landscape is not about politics, it is politics, and the mine's ability to inscribe proof of its regime 
in the valley -- namely, by tearing up large swaths of it -- provides a literally monumental dem-
onstration of its puissance as a collective subject.
The apotheosis of corporate puissance is, of course, the discourse of sustainability. The 
mine's ability to establish a new modus vivendi that will persist after its own actions stop and it 
closes represents the ultimate exemplification of the mine's claim to technical mastery. This is 
particularly clear in the case of sustainability which, by all accounts, is “more than just mine clo-
sure” but rather the permanent and ongoing state of affairs called 'life after the mine'. Narratives 
of ‘sustainable development’ after closure envision a collective subjectivity so powerful that it 
will continue to effect large-scale and long-duration change even after it ceases to exist through 
its regimentation of existing conditions. Creating a sustainable future for the valley requires en-
gineering a set of social conditions and routines that will persist even when the engineer (the 
mine) is no longer present. 
How do you convince people that there is a macrosociological order of which they are a 
part? Let me take here a very brief example of the slippery nature of role inhabitance in the cor-
porate discourse of sustainability. Consider, for instance, the original sustainability policy of 
Placer Dome (the former operators of the Porgera gold mine) from 1999. The cover of the docu-
ment -- printed on textured, organic-looking paper -- features an image of earth from space with 
5 Smith, “The Political Landscape”
an adorable picture of an adorable girl of elusive but brown ethnicity holding two baby chicks. 
“This policy doesn't mean a thing...” say the bold words on the cover. On the recto side of the 
opening spread read the words '...without you'. Immediately beneath them in small caps is the 
phrase “We're committed”. On the lower right hand corner of the page is the then-CEO of placer 
dome, John Wilson, leaning against a tree dressed in jeans, and a sweater with a pair of binocu-
lars around his neck caught impromptu, perhaps, in the act of birding. The closing paragraph of 
the page reads
“The [sustainability] policy has been developed with the consultation and contribution of 
Placer Dome employees. It is our policy and our commitment. This ownership ensures the sup-
port of the policy and elaboration into action.”
Here readers are figured as employees and are enjoined to 'take ownership' and act as if 
the policy was their own since it was generated with 'consultation' and 'contributions' by other 
employees who were – theoretically – of the same mind as them despite the fact that – given 
Placer's 10,000 or so employees – they never met those (unspecified) coworkers. This double 
mediation – the will of the company is personified in our executives who personify the will of 
someone like you – is typical of the construction of corporateness in the mine. Ownership -- the 
internalization of a certain emotional disposition -- is facilitated by positive (paternalistic?) feel-
ings one is (I assume) supposed to have for the child on the cover.
The network of executives who make decisions about sustainability 6 have decided that 
the mine is not to be seen as evil or weak. And yet at the same time it is strategically necessary to 
create situations in which the mine is not omnipotent. Denotationally, discussions of closure are 
6 I don’t have time here to untangle them in front of you, unfortunately, but they are quite small.
descriptions of future actions, but pragmatically they are about aligning social relationships in 
the course of ongoing negotiations with the state and grassroots people. Admission of its own 
finitude can in fact be a key way for the mine to avoid positioning itself as liable for future plans, 
particularly those that touch on “sustainability.” Here, the mine's ability to plan for the future – 
which should, as the result of it technical mastery, be unproblematic, hinges on the uncertain and 
uncontrollable decisions of fellow stakeholders. 
As a result the mine portrays itself as the agent of positive change and not negative 
change, since negative change is the result of other stakeholders failing to go along with the 
mine's plans. By delineating the mine as an entity whose powers and external boundary can be 
clearly delineated, mine representatives limit the mine's liability in situations where outcomes are 
uncertain and the moral author of chains of actions remains ambiguous.  “Quite simply,” as one 
document puts it, “a sustainable future for the people of Porgera and the surrounding areas can-
not be achieved by PJV alone, but requires substantial commitment from all stakeholders” {PJV 
2002 @ 33}. A footnote cites another study which claims that “communities need to own this 
process and organise themselves accordingly” {PJV 2002 @ 33}. As one often hears around 
Porgera, “the mine cannot be responsible for all of the social problems in the valley” except, of 
course, for the ones that it ameliorates through it generous social programs – for which it takes 
credit.
Utopic unity is at the heart of a great deal of Melanesian organizing. As Lamont Lind-
strom puts it7, Melanesia is the place where people “ hope and work for community and for con-
sensus but expect the worse.” This is more than just Peter Worsely has argued that cargo cults 
7 Lindstom, “Dreaming of Unity and Cargo in Melanesia” -- which is excellent, btw. Much of this section is 
copping his stuff.
“weld previously hostile and separate groups together into a new unity”. This is more than just 
encouraging shareholders to take ownership. Leaders of these movements -- which we may or 
may no want to call Cargo Cults -- justify their rule by virtue of their contact with a divine force 
which has a plan for us (even if it has not, in this case, slain leviathan). The “totalitarian dream” 
that Lindstrom notes in cargo culture  -- “ a dream of law and order—a vision of obedience, 
regularity, and totality.  Everyone observes the moral code.  Everyone obeys in all things.  No 
one straggles.  Utopian unity is made naturally obvious in collective drilling and marching” -- is 
of course model of bureaucratically regimented action used by the mine to eliminate the contin-
gent and maintain operations through standard operating procedure. 
Of course, it is important not to overplay the similarities between the Porgera Gold mine 
and the movements Lindstrom discusses. Despite discourses of ‘modern’ mines and ‘ancient 
stone age New Guineans’, I have argued that it is in fact the other way around -- bureaucratic, 
hierarchically organized institutions such as corporations are 'cold' because, as Weber might say, 
they seek to eliminate the coningent and reproduce the order ensonced in standard operating pro-
cedure. Papua New Guineans, on the other hand, 'ransack the present for novelty' (Rumsey and 
Merlan) in a way similar to a certain sort of Benjaminian-Baudelarian modern might. They are, 
thus, 'hot'. The problem, as N.W. Bird, the creator of the term 'cargo cult' pointed out so many 
years ago, is not that Melanesians are unreliable, it is that they are unpredictable. It is difficult to 
maintain this analysis because it immediately threatens to collapse into binaries that people are 
much more familiar with: either Melanesians are either ecologically noble savages or they are 
nasty savages with a predilection to predate the charismaic megafauna that environmentalists 
cherish8.
And yet... some ‘cargo cults’ have in fact proven to last far longer than some mines. The 
Yali movement, of course, doesn't move 200,000 tons of earth a day but it has managed to be a 
decades-long regional force which has managed to elect Yali's scion, James Yali, to national of-
fice despite his incarnarceration for raping his wife's sister. Similarly, John Frum is still alive and 
well on Tanna, and the Christian Fellowship Church is now on its second generation of leader 
who has recently been knighted by the Queen (of England). 
Not only do ‘cargo cults’ have enviable longevity, they are taking forms that make it dif-
ficult to automatically discredit them -- what else are they, after all, then community based or-
ganizations? Nick Bainton’s description of the "personal viability" system on Lihir -- wasp self-
improvement courses with a Melanesian wist -- blur the line between 'realistic' development and 
'cargo cult'. Similarly, the Christian Fellowship Church  is currently negotiating contracts for sus-
tainable forestry and development projects (Fa'anunu 2006). 
In conclusion, as my invocation of Leviathan indicates, issues of the credibility of macro-
actors are, like most important perennial problems in social science, extremely old and criticisms 
of pretensions to puissance are equally ancient. Mines may be able to (as the psalmist writes) 
makes the earth melt like wax and move mountains -- literally -- but in the end everything (to 
quote a different axial age thinker) is impermanent and "all is vanity and frustration" (Kohelet). 
8 I never speak of cargo cult in my work, although the implications are obviously there. I just say “PNGi-
ans aren’t cultish they’re just ‘modern’ -- more ‘modern’ than us”. 
As we move forward in our analyses of credibility and social organization, I have suggested, it 
would be interesting to shift the analytic gaze from cargo cultsto the unexamined half of this us-
them contrast: the taken for granted ‘capacity’ of ‘Western’ forms of organization. It is salutary to 
re-examine the claims of capital to efficacy, as well as credibility-dismissing claims of the 
merely 'cult' status of Melanesian movements today.
